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[Abstract] In this working paper Pernille Rieker looks into the relationship between the
European integration pro-cess and changes in Norway’s national security identity. Has the
domi-nant natio--nal discourse on security changed since the early 1990s? If so, how are
these changes related to the recent acceleration of the European integration pro--cess? And to
what extent are such European influences on national secur-ity identities related to formal
membership in the EU?  While there is reason to believe that a Europeanisation of national
secur-ity policies has taken place, the question is whether we may speak of a pro-found
change in identity, or merely an instrumental adaptation to external changes. Several
researchers have studied the influence of this participation on national institutions and
policies; less attention, however, has been given to the Europeanisation of Norway’s
security identity. This paper is an attempt to fill this gap.
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By Pernille Rieker 
1.1 Introduction 
This paper looks into the relationship between the European integration pro-
cess and changes in Norway’s national security identity.2 Has the dominant 
national discourse on security changed since the early 1990s? If so, how are 
these changes related to the recent acceleration of the European integration 
process? And to what extent are such European influences on national secur-
ity identities related to formal membership in the EU?  
While there is reason to believe that a Europeanisation of national secur-
ity policies has taken place, the question is whether we may speak of a pro-
found change in identity, or merely an instrumental adaptation to external 
changes. Several researchers have studied the influence of this participation 
on national institutions and policies; less attention, however, has been given 
to the Europeanisation of Norway’s security identity.  
This paper, focusing on Norway, is a part of a larger research project that 
examines changes in security identities in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and 
Sweden as related to European integration. Formally, Norway is not a mem-
ber of the EU. On the other hand, it is a founding member of NATO and 
enjoys close relations with the European Union, through a wide range of spe-
cial agreements, informal contacts and ad hoc constellations. Thus, Norway 
is a good case for examining the ‘reach’ of Europeanisation. The data pre-
sented here are based on information collected through interviews with offi-
cials in Norway’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its Ministry of Defence, in 
addition to officials in the Norwegian delegations to both NATO and the EU. 
The interviews were carried out between March 2001 and June 2001.  
Although my focus is restricted to studying the impact of the EU, this 
does not mean that other factors – geopolitics, domestic policy processes, 
bureaucratic politics etc. – are unimportant. However, the intention here is to 
                                                 
1  This paper was initially written for (and presented at) the fourth ECPR pan-European 
International Relations Conference held at the University of Kent in Canterbury 8–10 
September 2001.  
2  The dominant national security discourse will be used here as an indicator of this national 
identity. In order to identify such a discourse I examine the language used in official 
documents and speeches. 
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identify and interpret the impact of the European integration process – not to 
achieve an overall explanation for why Norway’s security identity is as it is 
today. 
I begin by presenting an alternative perspective on the concept of security 
and the EU as a security actor. I argue that the EU could be seen as constitut-
ing a tightly coupled security system potentially challenging and changing 
the security identities of nation-states. Second, I discuss the development of 
Norway’s security identity in the post-Cold War era and examine how, and 
to what extent, the European Union has had an impact this identity. I con-
clude by identifying and analysing the character of the impact of the Euro-
pean integration process.  
1.2 Security and integration  
1.2.1 Towards an alternative way of studying security 
The impact of the EU on national security identities will be dependent upon 
how security is defined, so an initial discussion of the concept of security 
seems mandated. Although few scholars today defend the narrow definition 
from the days of the Cold War, when security was seen exclusively in mili-
tary terms, this does not mean that consensus exists on what a more broadly 
constructed conception entails. As Helga Haftendorn notes, there is ‘no com-
mon understanding of what security is, how it can be conceptualised, and 
what its most relevant research questions are’ (Haftendorn 1991: 15).  
 While some have argued that the concept of security should be expanded 
to include phenomena that in ordinary parlance are often seen as threats to 
acquired values – such as poverty, environmental hazards, pollution and eco-
nomic recessions (Ullmann 1983; Westing 1986; Westing 1988; Mathews 
1989) – others, like Stephen Walt, claim that a widened security concept 
‘would destroy its intellectual coherence, and make it more difficult to 
devise solutions…’ (Walt 1991: 213). In Security. A New Framework for 
Analysis (1998), Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde offer a compromise between 
these two positions. On the one hand, they take seriously the traditionalist 
complaint about intellectual incoherence by maintaining that an international 
security issue must be understood in the same way as the traditional military-
political rendering of security. That is, security is about survival of a referent 
object (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state) in the face of existential 
threats. On the other hand, they disagree with the traditionalists that the only 
or the best way to deal with such incoherence is the retreat into a military 
core. 
 In their view, a more differentiated picture of the primary units of the 
international system can be obtained by using a neo-conventional security 
analysis that retains the traditional core of the concept of security (existentia l 
threats, survival), but is undogmatic as to both sectors (not only the military) 
and referent objects (not only the state). This approach allows us to widen 
and deepen the security agenda without destroying its intellectual coherence.  
Further, according to Buzan et al., an issue becomes a security issue only 
when it is presented as a threat. ‘Security’ is thus seen as a self-referential 
practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue. 
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The special nature of security threats justifies the use of extraordinary mea-
sures to handle them (Buzan et al. 1998: 21). This means that something is 
designated as an international security issue because it can be argued that it 
is more important than other issues and should therefore have highest prior-
ity. When a (securitising) actor uses a rhetoric of existential threat, thereby 
taking an issue out of ‘normal politics’, we have what they call a case of 
‘securitisation’. According to the Copenhagen School3, the process of securi-
tisation is intersubjective and socially constructed: it is the actor who decides 
whether something is to be handled as an existential threat. However, a dis-
course that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to 
a referent object does not by itself create securitisation. This is what Buzan 
et al. term a ‘securitising move’. An issue is securitised only when it is 
accepted as such by society. This process of securitisation is by some called 
a ‘speech act’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 24–26).  
However, ‘security’ should not become elevated into a kind of Universal 
Good Thing. As Wæver (1995) has argued, this is a dangerously narrow 
view because the word ‘security’ might extend the call for state mobilisation 
to a broad range of issues. At best, security is a kind of stabilisation of con-
flictual or threatening relations, often through emergency mobilisation of the 
state. Although security in international relations may generally be prefer-
able to insecurity, it might be better, as Wæver argues, to aim for ‘desecuriti-
sation’ – shifting issues out of the emergency mode and into the normal bar-
gaining processes of the political sphere.  
While the Copenhagen School has made an important contribution to 
security studies and to the scholarly debate concerning the meaning of secur-
ity, they are less clear about how to operationalise such new concepts as 
‘securitising move’, ‘securitisation’ and ‘desecuritisation’. The various indi-
cations they provide are open to different interpretations. One idea is that a 
discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat 
to a referent object does not by itself create securitisation. Rather, it is 
assumed that securitisation and desecuritising ‘happen’ in various stages, 
beginning with a rhetorical phase. In this initial phase the securitising actor 
merely makes a ‘securitising move’ – i.e. uses the rhetoric of existential 
threat (phase I). According to Buzan et al., an issue is not securitised until 
‘the audience accepts it as such’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 25). One way of opera-
tionalising this shift is to claim that securitisation ‘happens’ when the securi-
tising actor goes one step further and moves from general political deliberati-
ons or discourses to actual decisionmaking. When decisions are adopted 
along the same lines as expressed in the security discourse, without any 
strong popular resistance or protest, one may assume that public acceptance 
has been obtained (phase II). In order to desecuritise an issue, the securitis-
ing actor has to take measures to move the securitised issues out of the 
‘threat-defence sequence and into the ordinary public sphere’ (Buzan et al. 
1998: 29). According to the Copenhagen School, desecuritisation is the opti-
mal long-range option, since it means not to have issues phrased as ‘threats 
                                                 
3  The Copenhagen school or the Copenhagen research group is a group of researcher (Ole 
Wæver, Barry Buzan and Jaap de Wilde) which argues that security is a particular type of 
politics applicable to a wide range of issues. Answering the traditionalists charge that this 
offer a constructivist operational method for distinguishing securitization from politiza-
tion (Buzan et al. 1998).  
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against which we have countermeasures’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 29). Even 
though it is a long-term option, one may claim that the desecuritising phase 
begins already when the countermeasures are implemented. This is why I 
have chosen to operationalise this phase as the implementation phase (phase 
III), although I realise that desecuritisation does not occur until the desired 
effects are obtained. Following the logic of the Copenhagen School we may 
understand this implementation phase rather as a desecuritising move.  
1.2.2 The EU as a tightly coupled security community and a 
desecuritising actor 
A useful concept for understanding security dynamics of the EU is that of 
‘pluralistic security communities’, first developed by Karl W. Deutch 
(1957). By shifting the focus of security studies away from states and 
towards transnational social, political, economic, ecological, and moral for-
ces, this concept, coupled with a constructivist approach, offers a way to 
reorder our thinking about international security in the post-Cold War period 
(Adler 1997: 276). Once established, a community is based on an ‘inside-out 
model’, where states see their interests as best served by being inside the 
community (Adler and Barnett 1998: 119). Security is no longer defined 
exclusively as the protection of sovereign national borders from military 
threat. Security becomes something to be achieved through benefits accrued 
from participating in a ‘mature security community’.  
According to Adler and Barnett, a ‘mature security community’ develops 
through three phases. In the initial (nascent) phase, governments do not 
explicitly seek to create a security community: rather, they begin to consider 
how they might coordinate their relations in order to increase mutual secur-
ity. The second (ascendant) phase is characterised by the establishment of 
new institutions and organisations, reflecting both a tighter military coordi-
nation and a decreased fear that the other members of the community repre-
sent a threat. In turn, these networks result in changes in the cognitive struc-
tures, increasing the level of mutual trust and leading to the emergence of 
collective identities. This process is defined by an intensive and extensive 
network pattern between states that is likely to be produced by, and be a pro-
duct of, various international institutions and organisations. However, a core 
state, or a coalition of states, could remain important for stabilising and 
encouraging the further development of the security community. Finally 
comes the third (mature) phase. Now it becomes increasingly difficult for 
the members of this ‘region’ to think only in instrumental ways or to prepare 
for war among themselves (Adler and Barnett 1998:50–58). The emergence 
of such a community can be identified through various indicators that reflect 
a high degree of trust, a shared identity and a common vision of the future. 
Two more important factors are low or no probability that conflicts will lead 
to military encounters, and a marked differentiation between those within 
and those outside the security community.  
Adler and Barnett also distinguish between two ideal types of pluralistic 
security communities: ‘loosely coupled’ and ‘tightly coupled’ ones (Adler 
and Barnett 1998: 56–57). While the loosely coupled security community 
shows the minimal definitional properties – a transnational region made up 
of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peace-
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ful change – the tightly coupled one is more demanding in two respects. 
First, it constructs collective security system arrangements. Second, it 
possesses a system of rule endowed with common supranational and trans-
national institutions. The degree of coupling can be seen as a continuum. 
Different communities can be located differently on this continuum, and 
might vary over time. According to this definition, the trans-Atlantic com-
munity (NATO) can be characterised as a loosely coupled security commun-
ity, while the EU could be regarded as a tightly coupled one. Moreover, as 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) becomes an increasingly 
institutionalised part of the EU, the EU is developing into an increasingly 
more tightly coupled actor.  
How does the EU, as a tightly coupled security community, produce 
security? Here it is useful to distinguish between external and internal 
threats. The overall internal security argument is often used by EU represen-
tatives and state officials alike as ‘the peace argument’ of integration. Thus, 
integration is perceived as the bulwark against a return to Europe’s past – 
one characterised by of balance of power and by wars.  
Integration is thereby made an aim in itself. The alternative is seen as a 
self-propelling process among the European nation-states, a process that 
would reopen the previous insecurity caused by balance of power, national-
ism, and war (Wæver 1996). This is a fundamental security argument that 
defines the EU’s existence. According to this argument, the European inte-
gration process has managed to desecuritise the relations between the nation-
states of Europe. In a speech at Louvain University in February 1996, 
Helmut Kohl even argued that ‘the policy of European integration is in 
reality a question of war and peace in the 21st century’. 
In addition to this overall internal security argument, or desecuritisation, 
there are several other internal security arguments in favour of continued and 
further integration. These arguments are sector based; further integration is 
often used as an argument in order to desecuritise potential threats towards 
different kinds of referent objects inside the EU. For instance, further econo-
mic integration – notably the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) process 
– is taking place within the ‘first pillar’ of the European Union in order to 
avoid economic insecurity. The project has also been securitised by becom-
ing linked to the very existence of the EU as such. It has been claimed that 
the whole integration process will be threatened if the EMU fails (Santer 
1999). Also other threats linked to this pillar have been used as arguments 
for further integration: among them the fear of increased unemployment, 
social marginalisation and pollution. Further integration inside the ‘third pil-
lar’ of the European Union concerning justice and home affairs has been 
cited as an argument for combating internal threats such as terrorism, orga-
nised crime, international crime, drug trafficking, illegal immigration and 
xenophobia. 
External threats are potential threats that come from outside the commun-
ity and might threaten the stability of the security community as a whole. 
Also here the EU has the role as a desecuritising actor. Indeed, the EU can 
be said to have at least two such external security functions (Wæver 1997: 
20).  
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The first is to be a disciplining power on the EU’s ‘near abroad’.4 This 
refers to the role of the EU in exercising (implicit) ‘power’ by being attrac-
tive to the former East Bloc countries, and perhaps to the close South as 
well. The Stability Pact for Europe (the Balladur Plan of 1993), together 
with the 1999 Stability Pact for the Western Balkans, are attempts to formal-
ise this role. Especially the Western part of Eastern Europe has been strongly 
influenced, or disciplined, by being located close to the EU. This ‘magnet’ 
has had an impact on foreign as well as domestic developments in these 
countries: politicians, realising that they were monitored by the EU, have 
accepted the standards set by the EU in relation to for instance democracy, 
minorities, privatisations, and sub-regional relations. As these have had 
expectations about gradually moving closer to and eventually joining the 
EU, it made sense to act according to anticipated Western reactions.  
The second external security function is to have a potential role as direct 
intervener in specific conflicts in the community’s near abroad. In order to 
become a credible desecuritising actor, the EU has to be able to develop both 
a military and a civilian capability to intervene in conflicts that may destabil-
ise the continent. Recent commitments by the EU members indicate that the 
EU will have such a capability in 2003.  
In 1991 Jacques Delors gave a speech at the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies in London in which he analysed how aspects of security 
figured in European political and economic integration. He emphasised the 
importance of the wider notion of security, maintaining that ‘the defence 
issue is being raised in a very different context today from forty years ago, 
when the founding fathers believed that a European Defence Community 
could lead to a political Europe’ (Delors 1991: 2). In this speech, Delors saw 
security as an all-embracing concept dependent on the ability to create an 
attractive, harmonious society. Such a view of security covers not only pro-
blems of defence, but also problems of society at large. Delors went on to 
evaluate the security dynamics of the integration process and distinguished 
between internal and external security dynamics. Besides the main objective 
of the integration process, which has been to avoid another European war, he 
defined the internal security dynamics of the integration process as including 
efforts to combat ‘new’ threats such as international crime, terrorism, drug 
trafficking and pollution, as well as handling social and economic problems 
such as economic recession, unemployment and social exclusion. External 
security mechanisms he defined as efforts by the European Community to 
avoid conflicts in the community’s ‘near abroad’, which might threaten the 
stability of the continent as a whole. In addition to the EU’s external rela ti-
ons at large, these efforts include the enlargement process and developments 
towards the creation of a non-military and a military crisis management cap-
ability (Delors 1991). 
The distinction between internal and external security has also been 
emphasised by the current president of the European Commission, Romano 
Prodi:  
                                                 
4  This kind of power is equivalent to what Iver B. Neumann and Michael C. Williams refer 
to as ‘symbolic power’: the power which legitimates certains conceptions of identity and 
what is understood as appropriate action by the actors concerned (Williams and Neumann 
2000: 6).  
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Europe needs security. External security must be achieved by reducing unrest 
and tension on our borders. Internal security must be achieved by combating 
crime, including organised crime. Crime needs to be tackled at its source, which 
often lies in institutional disorder, poor education, social injustice and the soul-
nessness of inner cities and suburbs. Security should also mean a safe environ-
ment and safe consumer products, in particular safe food (Prodi 2000). 
 
Today’s EU stands as the most important desecuritising actor in a European 
security context where non-military threats have become increasingly impor-
tant. The advantage of this system compared to other and looser security 
communities, such as the OSCE and NATO, is that it is the result of a high 
level of political integration and pooled sovereignty. The high level of politi-
cal integration together with the comprehensive character of the integration 
process raises the EU’s capability to handle both internal and external secur-
ity challenges. 
The distinction between internal and external mechanism is useful for 
analytical reasons, but this difference is not always clear in practice. This 
point is well illustrated in the 2000 report of the Commission/High represen-
tative, Improving the Coherence and Effectiveness of the European Union 
Action in the Field of Conflict Prevention, submitted to the European 
Council in Nice. It emphasises the need to ‘to develop targeted common 
approaches to countries and regions at risk of conflict taking account of 
CFSP, development, trade and justice and home affairs issues’ (Commission/ 
High-Representative 2000). This was also further emphasised at the meeting 
of the European Council in Gothenburg in June 2000, with the adoption of 
‘A European Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts’. The 
mechanisms referred to as internal security mechanisms in this paper also 
may be used for external security purposes. The added value of the EU as a 
security actor lies precisely in its capacity to coordinate different security 
mechanisms more easily than other more specialised international organisati-
ons such as NATO. The comprehensive character of the integration process 
and its high level of political integration facilitate this task. Even though the 
EU has not yet managed to desecuritise all sectors, it has started to imple -
ment measures aiming at desecuritisation – it has taken a desecuritising 
move in many sectors.  
While a pluralistic security community does not erode the legitimacy of 
the state or replace the state, the more tightly coupled it is, the more will the 
role or identity of the state be transformed. The following section will exa-
mine the case of Norway since the end of the Cold War, asking whether this 
tightly coupled security community functioning as a desecuritising actor has 
had any effect on Norway’s security identity. 
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1.3 Norway’s security identity 
1.3.1 From Atlanticism to Europeanism?  
a) 1949–1992: Continued emphasis on territorial defence and NATO 
During the first half of the 1990s Norway’s security identity was highly 
traditional. While most other European states had moved beyond the Cold 
War and adopted a security thinking better suited to the new security con-
text, Norwegian policymakers and security analysts continued to define 
security in traditional terms, emphasising territory as the major referent 
object and collective defence through NATO as the main security policy 
means.  
While territorial defence has been the main focus of Norwegian security 
policy ever since independence in 1905 (Ulriksen 2001), the perceived need 
for participating in a military alliance has been more contested. Today, 
NATO membership is an important part of the Norwegian security identity, 
but this choice was not self-evident in 1949. Joining a military alliance like 
NATO represented a dramatic change for a country with little experience in 
foreign policy and with a preference for neutrality and isolationism.5 It was 
the painful experience of Nazi occupation during the Second World War 
combined with a new concern with the USSR’s expansionist policies and 
methods that eliminated neutrality as a viable security policy orientation for 
Norway. When attempts to create a Nordic defence cooperation failed in 
1948/49, membership in the Atlantic Alliance gradually emerged as the best 
policy option in the post-war security context.  
Over the next 40 years Norway was to become a devoted trans-Atlantic 
ally, due not least to its strategic geopolitical position. During the Cold War, 
Norway in fact attracted attention and diplomatic interest out of proportion 
to its size – military, economic or in terms of population. According to the 
Norwegian historian, Rolf Tamnes, Norway was the NATO country that 
received most support from the USA and its allies in proportion to its popu-
lation. Tamnes describes Norway’s relationship with the USA as so close as 
to represent “an alliance within the alliance” (Tamnes 1997: 61). If Nor-
way’s decision to join NATO was as an instrumental adaptation to external 
changes, more than 40 years in NATO transformed the Norwegian security 
identity into true ‘Atlanticism’.  
                                                 
5  In 1905 Norway gained its independence after nearly four centuries under the dominance 
of first Denmark (1536–1814) and then Sweden (1814–1905). The first Norwegian for-
eign minister, Jørgen Løvland (1905–1908), emphasised two ambitions for the foreign 
and security policy of the new nation: (1) to defend Norway’s economic interests and (2) 
to keep the country out of war between the European powers. An active trade policy was 
to protect the country;s economic interests while non-alignment in peace and neutrality in 
war was the main strategy for protection against international conflicts. At the same time 
defence of international norms and the respect for international law was seen as important 
in order to guarantee the interests of a small state like Norway. Actually, foreign and 
security policy was not a major concern for Norway at that time. There was general agree-
ment that conflicts and wars were the result of a hidden greatpower game and that small 
states were better off isolating themselves from such antics. The Norwegian Foreign Min-
ister’s negative conception of the other European states is evident in the following state-
ment: “the aim is to keep us outside participation in those combinations of alliances and 
alliances that might drag us into wars together with some of the European warrior states” 
(Neumann and Ulriksen 1997). 
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Norway’s special position within NATO was seriously challenged with 
the end of the Cold War – which may explains why Norway has been so 
ambivalent to this historically important transition. On the one hand, the end 
of the Cold War was something Norway had long waited and worked for, 
through UN and CSCE. On the other hand, Norwegians politicians feared 
that this change would lessen international interest in the Nordic region. 
While the breakdown of the Soviet Union, which reduced military concerns 
and automatically increased the influence of the European integration pro-
cess, was seen as a positive development by most other European states, the 
Norwegian political leadership was sceptical. It feared that a more indepen-
dent European security policy would reduce the US interest in Europe, leav-
ing Norway more vulnerable to possible pressure from Russia. This worry 
was expressed in the report from the 1990 report of the Norwegian Defence 
Commission: 
 
Europe must under no circumstances send signals that might reduce NATO’s 
role or weaken the basis for the US engagement in the Alliance (NOU 1992, my 
translation). 
  
Norway was one of the last countries to accept NATO’s new strategic con-
cept of 1991. This is a further indication that Norway was having difficulties 
in moving beyond the Cold War (Sjursen 1999).  
The historical changes were not totally ignored by the Norwegian leader-
ship, however. In a White Paper from 1993 (Forsvarsdepartement 1993) the 
Ministry of Defence argued that the conditions governing Norwegian secur-
ity had changed. and that Nordic security had to be viewed in a wider Euro-
pean perspective. While this resulted in the establishment of the ‘Telemark 
Battalion’ for NATO’s newly established immediate reaction forces (IRF)6, 
it did not change the main thrust of Norwegian security thinking. National 
defence against a potential military invasion continued to be given priority. 
As Iver Neumann and Ståle Ulriksen have claimed, this White Book was 
largely based on the same national security thinking as that of the Cold War 
period (Neumann and Ulriksen 1997). Despite some paragraphs referring the 
new security context and the importance of non-military challenges 
(Forsvarsdepartement 1993: 32), the emphasis remained on the need for a 
credible national defence. Russia was not seen as a direct threat at that time, 
but considerable stress was placed on the instability in Russia and the possi-
bility of the return of an authoritarian Russian regime (Forsvarsdepartement 
1993: 51).  
This continued traditional security policy explains why there was scant 
enthusiasm in Norway for the new NATO, with the establishment of its 
Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) and Partnership for Peace (PfP) (Archer 
1996).7 While these changes made it possible for NATO to function as a 
collective security organisation with a more flexible military structure better 
adapted to handle what most members perceived as the new challenges, the 
                                                 
6  At the NATO summit in Rome in 1991 the NATO countries adopted a new strategic con-
cept which included a new structure of forces. It was decided to create multinational for-
ces for rapid reaction, the so-called ‘Reaction Forces’.  
7  These decisions were taken at the NATO summit in Brussels in January 1994. 
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Norwegian military and government still maintained that NATO’s chief task 
should continue to be collective defence.  
Even though there was some understanding of the changed security con-
text, security policy remained traditional in Norway long after the other 
European countries had abandoned this mode of perceiving security and 
threats in Europe (Wæver and Wiberg 1992: 33). Because of this perception 
of its geopolitical ‘reality’, neither the political leadership or the Establish-
ment questioned what Norway’s security policy should be; what should be 
defended, and against what threat. How ‘Norway’ should be interpreted was 
not questioned: the referent object would remain the land-based geographical 
unit (Neumann and Ulriksen 1997). According to the Norwegian defence 
tradition, the main task of defence is to mobilise and lead the people in 
defence of the national territory. This has, as Ståle Ulriksen (2001) notes, 
created a rather limited conception of what security policy is all about. It 
also helps to explain the traditional definition of security policy still found in 
Norway. As in 1905, there still is little understanding about using the 
military as a political instrument. The chief task of the national military 
remains territorial defence. As Ulriksen points out, this tradition prevents 
Norwegian policymakers from understanding the complexities of today’s 
security context (Ulriksen 2001: 60).  
b) 1992–1994: A compromise between ‘Atlanticism’ and ‘Europeanism’  
Even though the Norwegian security identity continued to be dominated by 
territorial defence, some important non-military or ‘soft’ security initiatives 
were either initiated or at least strongly supported by the Norwegian govern-
ment in the early 1990s. The first initiative came in March 1992 when the 
Danish and German Foreign Ministers invited the Foreign Ministers of 
Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden and a 
representative of the European Commission to meet in Copenhagen. The aim 
was to strengthen cooperation among the Baltic Sea States and to decide on 
the establishment of a Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS). The Minis-
ters found that the recent dramatic changes in Europe heralded a new era of 
European relations, where the confrontation and division of the past had 
been replaced by partnership and cooperation. An enhanced and streng-
thened Baltic Sea cooperation was seen as a natural and logical consequence 
of these events. The Ministers agreed that the Council of the Baltic Sea 
States should serve as an overall regional forum focusing on intensified 
cooperation and coordination among the Baltic Sea States. The aim of such 
cooperation should be to achieve a genuinely democratic development in the 
Baltic Sea region, as well as greater unity between the member countries, 
and also to secure a favourable economic development.  
While participating in this framework was seen as important to Norway, 
developing a similar framework for cooperation in the Barents region was 
seen as even more important. The Norwegian Foreign Minister, Thorvald 
Stoltenberg, therefore presented the Barents Region Initiative, calling for 
cooperation between north-western Russia and the Nordic states north of the 
Arctic Circle. The initiative presupposed a lasting community of interest 
between East and West and emphasised civilian more than military pro-
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blems.8 The Kirkenes Declaration, which established the Barents Council in 
January 1993, followed the same logic as the Council of the Baltic Sea 
States, with representatives from all the Nordic countries, Russia and the 
European Commission.9  
While the national security thinking remained dominated by NATO and 
territorial defence, the Norwegian power elite found a compromise with the 
Barents cooperation initiative of 1992, which leaned to the ‘European’ side. 
NATO was still perceived as the most important security actor, but Nor-
wegian policymakers also recognised the need for other initiatives and saw 
the potential of the EU in this respect. Johan Jørgen Holst, former Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, described the Barents Region as a Euro-Arctic Nordic-
Russian ‘meeting place’, requiring attention from the EU and aiming to ‘nor-
malise and stabilise’ relationships between East and West, as contribution to 
‘a new European security structure’ (Tunander 1996: 55). Prime Minister 
Gro Harlem Brundtland also emphasised the importance of the European 
dimension in this cooperation initiative: 
 
We need a stronger European basis when developing the cooperation eastwards 
(Quoted in Tamnes 1997: 240) 
 
However, despite increased recognition of the importance of the EU, there 
was still a tendency to interpret these initiatives as being general foreign pol-
icy rather than part of national security policy. Another indication of such a 
compromise was the explicit support for Norwegian EU membership given 
by ‘Atlanticists’ such as General Fredrik Bull Hansen and Professor Olav 
Riste, who emphasised the important security role of the Union (Tunander 
1996: 55). This Europeanisation must be understood as a reaction to the rec-
ently signed Maastricht Treaty, which transformed the European Community 
into a European Union that aimed a common security and defence policy. 
This new European dimension in Norwegian foreign policy marked the 
beginning of a closer relationship between Norway and the EU. This started 
in 1992 with the signing of the European Economic Agreement (EEA), the 
Norwegian application for EU membership, together with associated mem-
bership in the WEU and explicit support for the integration aims laid down 
in the Maastricht Treaty.10 Initially, this did not mean any radical change in 
Norway’s overall security identity, which remained dominated by territorial 
defence, NATO and the Atlantic dimension. While the need for military 
strength through NATO in northern Europe continued to be emphasised, the 
                                                 
8  The Barents Initiative includes the following fields of cooperation: economy, trade, sci-
ence and technology, tourism, the environment, infrastructure, educational and cultural 
exchange as well as the improvement of the situation of the indigenous peoples in the 
North. At the second meeting of the Barents Council in 1994, health issues were included 
as a specific area of cooperation. Finally, the Council decided at its sixth meeting in 1999 
to include youth policy as one of its development areas.  
9  Apart from its seven members (Finland, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the Russian 
Federation and the Commission of the European Union) it also includes nine observers: 
the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, the USA, Canada, Japan 
and Italy. 
10  The Norwegian application was submitted in November 1992 after a hefty debate within 
the ruling Labour Party under the leadership of Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland. 
The EEA agreement was adopted in October that year. 
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orthodox ‘Atlanticism’ was gradually losing support; the EU was perceived 
as a complement to NATO on the soft security side:  
 
Security and stability is not only a military challenge. Political and economical 
means are increasingly important. It is the EU that possesses the broadest range 
of such means […]. NATO membership and cooperation between North 
America and Europe are still essential for the security of Norway (Utenriks-
departementet 1993–94: 14, my translation). 
 
However, the interval between the signing of the treaty of accession in June 
1994 and the EU membership referendum held on 28 November 1994 led to 
a major change of attitude among members of the Norwegian foreign policy 
elite. This period is crucial to understanding the foreign policy cooperation 
within the EU, as Norway participated fully in the various working groups 
established under the CFSP. In this interim period Norway was also connec-
ted to the COREU network, a restricted data forum for exchange of informa-
tion on foreign and security policy issues. Even though the negative result of 
the 1994 Norwegian referendum brought an abrupt end to this learning pro-
cess, it led to an increased understanding of the EU as being a political pro-
ject as well, one that played an increasingly important role in the field of 
security policy (Sjursen 1999). As we shall see, this compromise between 
‘Atlanticism’ and ‘Europeanism’ that Norway reached in the early 1990s 
opened the way for an even closer relationship with the EU in the second 
half of decade. 
c) 1995–2001: Moving closer to the EU 
Since the EEA agreement already regulated Norway’s relationship to the 
EU’s first pillar, this period led to a strengthening of its relationship to the 
second and the third pillars. First, a political dialogue in relation to the EU’s 
CFSP was established. Although cooperation in the sphere of foreign policy 
in the EU had been initiated in the 1970 with the establishment of the Euro-
pean Political Cooperation (EPC) little interest had been shown from the 
Norwegian side. At that time Norway conducted its foreign and security 
policies through NATO, and any other (competing) multilateral fora, which 
did not include the United States, were regarded with suspicion (Knutsen 
2000). The new dialogue of the 1990s has given Norway a possibility to join 
the EU’s foreign and security policy statements and common positions. The 
number of such joint statements has increased. This is partly a result of Nor-
way being invited more often by the EU to join in, but also as a result of an 
unofficial Norwegian policy to follow EU statements as far as possible. Nor-
way has also been invited to participate in several working groups under 
CFSP – currently those working with security, the peace process in the 
Middle East, Western Balkans, Russia/CIS, OSCE, disarmament, weapon 
export and non-proliferation. The Norwegian government has also managed 
to obtain meetings twice a year at the political level concerning the CFSP, 
but their importance has proven rather limited. These meetings normally take 
place during the second day of sessions of the European Council, which 
means that the EU countries are seldom represented by members of their 
governments. Secondly, Norway has also worked at establishing a closer 
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link to the EU’s third pillar concerning Justice and Home affairs. These ef-
forts resulted in an agreement between the EU and Norway/Iceland in 1996, 
aimed at regulating the two countries’ participation in the Schengen arrange-
ments, which included police cooperation and common border control.  
With the EEA agreement, the political dialogue and the Schengen Agree-
ment, Norway had now managed to establish a close link to several major 
areas of the integration process. Some have characterised this situation as a 
kind of ‘Class B’ membership in the European Union. (Claes and Tranøy 
1999) – extended participation, but without the possibility of influencing 
decisions taken at the EU level.  
The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, which led to an acceleration of the inte-
gration process in the two intergovernmental EU pillars, made the situation 
even more problematic. Concerning the second pillar, the decisions taken in 
Amsterdam opened the way towards integration of the WEU into the EU. 
That could mean that Norway’s special member status in the WEU would be 
lost. This status had enabled Norwegian officials and the political leadership 
to participate at all levels, without the right to vote as the sole limitation. The 
expressed ambition of the Norwegian government was therefore to obtain a 
similar status in the future EU arrangements. This need became even more 
important after the French–British summit in St. Malô in December 1998, 
when France and Britain, for the first time in the history of European inte-
gration, agreed upon the need for an independent European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP). This initiative was followed up by the EU countries 
throughout 1999. Even though Norway’s initial ambition had been to con-
vince the EU members to transfer Norway’s special WEU member status, 
this was soon seen as unrealistic.11 Comparing Norway’s initial ambitions 
with the outcome of the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 when 
the ESDP was formally launched clearly shows the Norway’s overly ambiti-
ous diplomatic efforts had failed. The European Council suggested the estab-
lishment of ‘appropriate arrangements’ for the participation of non-EU 
allies, under condition that the decision-making autonomy of the EU was 
retained.12 While the longer-term importance of these meetings is difficult to 
foresee, the few sessions that already have taken place have been rather 
disappointing. Instead of being invited to participate in the debate on how to 
conduct European security policy, third countries have been allocated a 
                                                 
11  In October 1999 the Norwegian government issued a memo in connection with the EU’s 
preparation for the European Council in Helsinki. The PM expressed Norway’s support 
for the development of an ESDP, but also proposed to the EU how the 6 non-EU allies 
could be involved in the decision-making structures. This proposal involved day-to-day 
consultations in the proposed Political and Security Committee and in subsidiary working 
groups. The non-EU allies would have the right to speak and make motions and have 
access to all relevant documents and information. This format would also be the basis for 
regular consultations in the proposed Military Committee.  
(http://www.atlanterhavskomiteen.no/publikasjoner/andre/dokumenter/memo.htm) 
12  Later (at the European Council in Feira and Nice) this rather vague suggestion was made 
more concrete, opening the way for meetings between the EU and all the candidate-
countries together with Iceland and Norway (the so-called 15+15), but also some special 
meetings between the EU and the non-EU allies (the so-called 15+6). Participation will be 
different in the operational phase, where the contributing non-members will be invited to 
participate in an ad hoc committee of contributors. In such a phase, the ‘appropriate 
arrangements’ will imply day-to-day consultations and discussions on how to conduct the 
operation. 
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basically passive role in which they are merely informed of the status of the 
EU’s work in this area.  
Concerning the third pillar, the Amsterdam Treaty also introduced some 
important changes with consequences for Norway. The EU countries deci-
ded to integrate the Schengen cooperation into the first pillar, which meant it 
would be handled within the EU institutions and no longer as intergovern-
mental cooperation. The agreement of 1996 was therefore no longer valid, so 
Norway and Iceland had to negotiate a new agreement in order to ensure 
themselves at least some influence in the decision making process. The new 
agreement, signed in May 1999, resulted in the establishment of a common 
forum between the EU and the two non-members, where Schengen questions 
would be discussed. As part of this arrangement Norway also joined the 
European passport-free zone together with the other Nordic states in March 
2001.  
To summarise, even though Norway is still a non-member to the EU, the 
Norwegian government has made numerous efforts to establish a close rela -
tionship with the EU in all major areas of the integration process. This 
indicates a move towards greater Europeanism in Norway’s foreign policy. 
In the next section we examine how this closer relationship has affected Nor-
way’s post-Cold War security identity.  
1.3.2 A Europeanisation of national security identity  
In the relationship between the integration process and Norwegian security 
identity, it is the ESDP process that has received greatest attention. As a 
reaction to this process, which started with the St. Malô summit in December 
1998, the Norwegian security discourse came to place more emphasis on 
Europeanism and international crisis management. Although this marks an 
important change in Norway’s traditional security approach, it only implies 
another way of interpreting the main tasks of the defence forces. A more 
radical transformation would involve a totally new understanding and defini-
tion of security. Such a change would mean securitisation and desecuritisa-
tion in areas not traditionally seen as security aspects. Some moves in that 
direction can be identified at the EU level, as speeches by Jacques Delors 
and Romani Prodi indicate. This section deals with both types of security.  
a) Towards ‘Europeanism’ and international crisis management  
The first important change came in 1999, with Norway’s explicit support for 
the ESDP process and recognition of the need for transforming the national 
defence forces. This change was a reaction to a process which started with 
the Amsterdam Treaty in June 1997, but its importance was not recognised 
until after the St. Malô summit in December 1998. The fact that the Nor-
wegian government at that time was a coalition of parties all opposing EU 
membership makes the influence of this process on Norwegian security 
thinking and policy even more notable (Knutsen 2000: 26).  
The February 1988 White Book on defence shows that the government 
was at first rather reluctant to this process (Forsvarsdepartement 1998). Even 
though the White Paper states that active international involvement, substan-
tive contributions to NATO’s mutual defence arrangements and participation 
in peace operations even outside NATO’s borders, should form an important 
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part of Norwegian security and defence policy, suspicion towards a develop-
ment of an exclusive European security arrangement is clear and no impor-
tant initiatives for changing Norway’s defence forces are proposed. What is 
emphasised instead are the negative aspects of giving the EU a defence role, 
including negative views on a possible EU-WEU merger. The White Book 
stresses the adverse consequences of the EU developing into a ‘defence alli-
ance’, maintaining that such a development could harm the forthcoming EU 
enlargement because an EU role in the sphere of security and defence could 
alienate Russia and cause strains in the EU–Russian relationship (Knutsen 
2000: 22). For a long time, Norway denied the importance of CFSP (See for 
example Bondevik 1998), and until the St. Malô declaration the Norwegian 
government considered Britain’s traditional reluctant position to security 
cooperation in the EU as a guarantee for a continued Atlantic solution. 
In 1999 came a major change in how the Norwegian leadership perceived 
the emerging ESDP, which also led to increased awareness of urgent need to 
transform the military forces. In January 1999, only a month after the French 
British summit in St. Malô, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Knut Vollebæk, 
addressed the Norwegian parliament with a ‘Statement on the Government’s 
European policy, with emphasis on relations with the EU’. Vollebæk stated 
that the 
 
…experience gained from the peace process in the Middle East, the implementa-
tion and the follow-up of the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia and the efforts to 
reach cease-fire and a peaceful solution in Kosovo have strengthened the posi-
tion of those who feel that the EU should not only make an economic contribu-
tion but also play a more prominent role […] if the EU should become the frame-
work of political decisions on European security and crisis management to a 
greater extent than at present, the natural result would be for Norway and the EU 
to deepen their existing cooperation within the framework of the current arrange-
ment for political dialogue (Vollebæk 2000).  
 
He also emphasised that it was important for Norway to participate in ESDP 
so as to avoid losing influence in NATO: 
 
The continuation of full Norwegian participation in European security policy 
cooperation is also important, especially for our position in NATO. […] 
Norway’s rights as an ally, and as an associated member of WEU, should be 
maintained in any future solutions that may change the cooperation between the 
EU, the WEU and NATO (Vollebæk 2000).  
 
Norway’s prime concern was not the development of an EU dimension in 
the sphere of security and defence per se, but rather the fear of being 
excluded from the process, the fear that Norway’s new status would be 
inferior to its current position as an associated member of the WEU. In other 
words, the significant change in Norway’s attitude towards the security and 
defence dimension in the EU was rooted in a fear of being marginalised. 
An increased European focus was also evident in the reorganisation of 
the defence forces. The Norwegian government submitted a report to the 
Parliament in June 1999, stressing the need to reform Norway’s defence 
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forces, so as to improve the national capability to take part in peace support 
operations led by NATO or the EU (Forsvarsdepartementet 1998). This 
report must be understood as a major step towards Norwegian adaptation to 
the new security context and especially as a reaction to the recently launched 
process in the EU. In it, the government recommends the establishment of an 
Armed Forces Task Force for international operations, to consist of units 
from all branches of the armed forces and include more than 3500 personnel. 
It is to be capable of fulfilling both NATO Article 5 as well as non-Article 5 
missions and tasks, as well as being answerable to the WEU. It will also be 
assigned to future European force structures. (Knutsen 2000: 24)  
This development indicates that while Norway’s security thinking may 
still be dominated by a focus on territorial defence, and firmly rooted upon 
conscription, there is now greater emphasis on the capacity to participate in 
crisis management operations abroad. 
This modest move from territorial defence to international crisis manage-
ment has also led to an increased awareness of the need for a more radical 
adaptation of Norway’s security thinking in general. Thus, in July 1999 the 
Norwegian government decided to establish a Defence Policy Commission, 
mandated to:  
 
…review Norwegian defence policy, its scope and objectives. Our current 
defence is based on general conscription, allied coordination and international 
cooperation, and civil society is heavily involved in national defence as a whole. 
The Commission us charged with assessing how these instruments can be 
applied and adapted to meet the challenges of the future. (Quoted in Knutsen 
2000: 30) 
 
The conclusions of the Defence Commission, presented in late June 2000, 
indicated that the Norwegian armed forces were in deep crisis: 
 
The idea of nationally balanced forces exists only in rhetoric. The adjustments 
made during the 1990s have to a considerable extent failed, despite good intenti-
ons and high ambitions. The infrastructure and organisation of the forces are too 
large. (…) A continued turn away from the singular focus on traditional invasion 
defence towards a broader and more balanced structuring of the forces is needed. 
The future forces must be flexible, i.e. able to meet the challenges that may arise 
in the short and medium term, and able to adapt to a fundamentally different situ-
ation in the longer term (Quoted in Knutsen 2000: 47). 
 
On the basis of these conclusions as well as a report from the Chief of 
Defence (Forsvaret 2000), the government submitted a report to the Parlia -
ment in February 2001 (Forsvarsdepartementet 2001), proposing radical 
changes in the defence forces. The most important change is an increase in 
the special troops trained for international crisis management, but there are 
also some changes in analysing the security environment. 
It is the acceleration of the process towards an independent European 
crisis management capability that has made it important for Norway to adapt 
its security policy. While there was a bad link between the description of the 
new security context and the Norwegian security policy in the early 1990s, 
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the government has now managed to present a more overall and coordinated 
picture (Forsvarsdepartementet 2001). 
However, reactions to this report reflect a continued traditional approach, 
as well as a existing gap between the Norwegian Establishment and the Nor-
wegian people. When the Defence Minister Bjørn Tore Godal declared in an 
interview with Norway’s main newspaper, Aftenposten, that Russia no 
longer represents a threat to Norway, he was widely criticised for this state-
ment (Aftenposten, 11 February 2001). Reactions to the speech held by 
NATO’s Secretary General, Lord Robertson, in Oslo in February 2001 also 
reveal the disparities between Norway’s security thinking and the dominant 
line in NATO (Aftenposten, 3 February 2001). While the Norwegian 
Establishment may recognise the changed security context and the need for 
greater Europeanism and international crisis management, the Norwegian 
public still wants to retain territorial defence and NATO as the main ingredi-
ents of national security identity. The conclusions of the Parliamentary 
Standing Committee on Defence concerning the governmental proposal 
show that Norwegians are not yet ready for overly radical changes. It is 
especially the conservative parties that insist on the traditional understanding 
of security (Forsvarskomiteen 2001).  
Despite this continued traditionalism, the ESDP process has initiated a 
development in Norway – towards greater acceptance of the EU as an impor-
tant security actor and towards a stronger focus on international crisis 
management. The political leadership has begun to review the traditional 
understanding of national security (securitising move) and has also taken 
some decisions in this direction (securitisation). 
b) Towards a comprehensive national security thinking  
Norway’s security policy continues to be defined basically in military terms. 
While other referent objects than the national territory are now recognised 
and other challenges are formulated in security terms (securitisation), the 
focus remains on military means in order to meet these new challenges.  
Since the early 1990s the EU has been focusing more on a broader under-
standing of security and on promoting this as the added value of the EU as a 
security actor. This added value lies in the EU’s being able to coordinate dif-
ferent security mechanisms (internal and external) more easily than other, 
more specialised international organisations (Delors 1991; Prodi 2000). This 
section asks whether we can identify a similar development towards a com-
prehensive security thinking on the national level in Norway, and whether 
the EU has had any influence on this process.  
There still is a difference between how the new security context is 
defined, and what are considered the most important security policy means. 
In the official discourse new threats are frequently described as being chal-
lenges like international crime, pollution, terrorism, or the vulnerability of 
modern society’s dependence on information technology (securitising 
move). However, the security policy decisions (securitisation) that are adop-
ted and the implementation (desecuritising move) of these reflect a rather 
traditional type of security thinking. In a 1998 speech, Norwegian Foreign 
Minister Knut Vollebæk stated:  
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Security policy has become a more complex matter. This means that the Foreign 
Minister’s overall responsibility for security policy is getting more challenging. 
The distinction between domestic and foreign policy is totally different today 
(…) and this is affecting how one defines security. For instance, parts of our 
environmental policy are now defined as a security aspect.  
 
But even though he recognises the complexity of the security context, he still 
emphasises NATO and collective defence as the most important security 
means.  
 
Even though Europe has changed, it is the cooperation in NATO that remains the 
main basis for our and Europe’s security (...) The capability and will to collective 
defence remain the most important elements of the NATO cooperation 
(Vollebæk 1998). 
 
Thus, even though such ‘soft’ security initiatives as the Barents cooperation, 
the EU and NATO enlargement processes, and the stability pact for the 
Balkans are perceived as important for regional stability, priority is still 
given to ‘hard’ security, to NATO, collective defence and some elements of 
international crisis management.  
While the main change in the Norwegian security thinking has been 
limited to the role of the defence forces, we can note a slight tendency 
towards increased emphasis on the need for a more comprehensive approach 
to security that includes both civilian and military means. The EU has paid 
considerable attention to the need for better coordination between civil and 
military crisis management and for comprehensive conflict prevention, and 
the Norwegian political leadership has been supportive. However, even 
though these developments are lauded in speeches by the Norwegian politi-
cal leadership (securitising move) there is little  to indicate a transformation 
of national security policy to improve coordination between civilian and 
military component of international crisis management. While Norway has 
long experience of participating in international police operations through 
UN, WEU and OSCE,13 these have traditionally been administrated indepen-
dently and have therefore not entered into the overall security thinking. In a 
recent speech concerning a wider security concept, the Norwegian Foreign 
Minister Torbjørn Jagland claimed that: 
 
Complex conflicts are difficult to solve. An overall approach and extended 
cooperation between different actors are needed. The contribution may vary 
between military units, assistance in order to build up national police forces and 
functioning legal systems to humanitarian aid or more traditional and long-term 
economic aid (Jagland 2001, my translation). 
 
While the need for a coordinated approach is recognised also in the latest 
defence proposition issued by the government (Forsvarsdepartementet 2001: 
36) (securitising move), there is no mention of specific proposals for facili-
tating such coordination in the future (securitisation). On the other hand, 
Norway’s participation in the Stability Pact for the Western Balkans and the 
                                                 
13  Norway participated in 24 international police operations between 1989 and 2000. 
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fact that Norwegian officials are heading the working group with responsi-
bility for internal security might draw greater attention to this aspect. 
Despite few concrete changes towards a more comprehensive security 
thinking, we can at least identify some processes that indicate a perceived 
need to evaluate the current security context. One example is the decision 
taken by Norwegian government in September 1999, to establish an indepen-
dent commission to evaluate the current Norwegian security environment. 
The so-called ‘Vulnerability Commission’ delivered its report on 14 August 
2000 (NOU 2000) at the same time as the Defence Commission (NOU 2000) 
and the Chief of Defence (Forsvaret 2000) presented their reports on the 
transformation of the Norwegian defence forces. The Vulnerability Commis-
sion’s report identified a long list of current challenges to national security 
(terrorism, cyber warfare, pollution, diseases etc.), and made a proposal that 
indicated the need for the establishment of a Ministry responsible for coordi-
nating the different national security policy means.  
Initially, it had been intended that these three reports together should pro-
vide a comprehensive basis for the government’s work on the forthcoming 
proposition on the transformation of the Norwegian security policy in gene-
ral and the transformation of the defence forces in particular (Singsås 2000). 
However, while the two other reports were referred to this proposition, the 
report of the Vulnerability Commission was totally ignored (Forsvars-
departementet 2001). The fact that these aspects were overlooked indicates 
the difficulties of integrating non-military challenges into the overall natio-
nal security thinking. While there is general agreement on the need to focus 
on a broader range of threats14 (securitising move), there are great difficul-
ties in accepting radical changes in order to meet these new challenges 
(securitising).  
While many of these new threats are challenges that the EU has been 
taking seriously, there is scant mention of the EU in this respect. When the 
EU is mentioned it is rather in relation to the ESDP process and the EU’s 
relationship to NATO – indicating that any EU influence on this part of 
Norway’s national security thinking is less important than its influence on 
the transformation of the defence forces. However, the fact that Norway 
signed a new Schengen Agreement in 1999 led to recognition of many 
potential ‘new’ threats. These were discussed by the Vulnerability 
Commission, which was established only a few months after the signing of 
this agreement. While few of the Commission’s conclusions have led to 
tangible results, the Ministry’s proposition on the transformation of the 
defence forces made some changes with reference to the Schengen 
Agreement. These include an increase in the tasks and responsibilities of the 
                                                 
14  In a speech held by the State Secretary in the Ministry of Defence, Øyvind Singsås, 
(junior Minister or something, and in what Ministry?)in April 2000 many new challenges 
were referred to without excluding the traditional territorial threat. In fact he distinguished 
between four different groups of risks. The first was the traditional territorial threat, which 
in his eyes cannot be totally excluded even though there is no such threat against any of 
the NATO countries for the moment. The second group of risks was regional instability in 
NATOs near abroad, which could threaten the stability to one or more of the allies. The 
third group of risks is the proliferation weapons of mass destruction. Finally he refers to 
terrorism and international crime as important security challenges. Related to this he also 
emphasises the need for cooperation with the police forces for handling these kind of 
challenges (Singsås 2000). 
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Coast Guard and the forces supervising Norway’s border with Russia 
(Forsvarsdepartementet 2001: 33).  
To summarise, we may note some movement towards a broader security 
approach, but the main focus of Norway’s security thinking remains on the 
military aspects. Even though the comprehensive security thinking of the EU 
has had some influence, the Europeanisation of national security is most 
clearly seen in relation to the ESDP process. Here the discourse has been 
closely linked to developments in the EU, and it has been matched with deci-
sionmaking activities. In the other areas of security, the linkage to the EU is 
less evident. Although the discourse has shifted slightly, it has not attracted 
much attention, nor has it been accompanied by decisions.  
1.4 Instrumental adaptation or identity change?  
We have seen that the EU has had an important impact on the development 
of Norway’s security identity since the end of the Cold War. The character 
and the strength of this Europeanisation have changed over time according to 
different dimensions of security. I will conclude by discussing whether this 
Europeanisation of the Norwegian security discourse represents a radical 
change in national security identity, or is simply a perceived instrumental 
and necessary adaptation to external changes.  
A profound change in identity often takes place over time and exhibits 
various phases, and it could be related to short-term instrumental adaptati-
ons. This is why I have chosen to understand these changes as part of a soci-
alisation process. Since national security discourse is closely linked to natio-
nal identity, changes tend to be slow. According to Risse and Sikkink (1999) 
such a socialisation process has five phases. 
The starting point is a situation where the traditional discourse is still 
dominant. The political leaders employ the traditional security rhetoric even 
though the international context has changed. As we have seen, a traditional 
security discourse continued longer in Norway than in many other European 
states. This discourse was characterised by a continued emphasis on terri-
torial defence and collective defence through NATO, combined with con-
tinued scepticism towards the European integration process.  
In the second phase, a new political discourse begins to be heard, with 
some groups at the domestic level adopting this discourse and trying to con-
vince the authorities. Even though the initial reaction by the political leaders 
is a defence of the traditional policy, this defence may be seen as indicating 
that a process of socialisation is already under way – otherwise there would 
be no need to defend the traditional policy. We can identify the beginnings 
of a debate concerning the Norwegian security identity as early as in 1992; 
this came as a reaction to the Maastricht Treaty and the creation of a Com-
mon Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Despite increased recognition of 
the potential of the EU on the soft security side – especially with the Baltic 
Sea and Barents cooperation initiatives, where the EU was expected to play 
an important role – the official national security discourse was still domi-
nated by a traditional approach to security. However, these initiatives 
together with the EEA agreement and the Norwegian application for EU 
membership indicate a certain Europeanisation of the Norwegian foreign 
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policy – or at least that the orthodox Atlanticism of the Cold War period was 
beginning to lose support. While Norway’s security policy remained domi-
nated by a rather traditional approach, the door is gradually opened to admit 
for a closer relationship between Norway and the EU after the November 
1994 referendum. A debate concerning the role of the defence forces started 
after the NATO summit in Brussels in January 1994, where NATO made 
decisions concerning CJTF and PfP (NATO’s new tasks) and recognised the 
importance of the Maastricht Treaty and the development of a European 
Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). While official Norwegian policy con-
tinued to give priority to collective defence, some started to emphasise the 
need for a change towards Europeanism and international crisis management 
(Neumann and Ulriksen 1997).  
In the third phase of the socialisation process, the domestic political lead-
ers realise that adopting a new way of thinking and changing their policy is 
important if they are to obtain influence, and to ensure (traditional) national 
interests in a changed international context. Actors now adapt incrementally 
to norms in response to external and internal pressures, initially for purely 
instrumental reasons. Slowly but surely, governments become entrapped in 
their own rhetoric and statements. In relation to the Norwegian security iden-
tity, we can identify such a process with the ESDP process. In the beginning 
the Norwegian political leadership was reluctant; then, after the St. Malô 
summit in December 1998, the Norwegian government started to fear that 
Norway would become marginalised in the new European security context. 
The Norwegian reactions to this process indicate what was initially an instru-
mental adaptation, followed by tendencies of a more profound change, or at 
least recognition of the need for such a change. One expression of this is the 
June 1999 decision on the establishment of a defence policy commission 
mandated to review Norwegian defence policy, its scope and objectives. Far 
more difficult is finding examples of a similar process in relation to the 
development towards a more comprehensive security thinking. However, the 
new Schengen Agreement of 1999 may have had some influence. This 
agreement made many of the ‘new’ challenges more real, as it meant a com-
mon border control with the EU. The most important national initiative for 
evaluating such challenges was the decision to establish the Vulnerability 
Commission in September 1999. And then, the Commission’s conclusions, 
presented in August 2000, were set aside, and not even mentioned in the 
latest report on the transformation of the Norwegian security and defence 
policy – clearly indicating the difficulties of integrating these aspects into the 
larger security discourse.  
In the fourth phase, governments are convinced/persuaded that norm 
compliance is the ‘right thing’, and not only an instrumental adaptation to a 
changed international context. National governments might then change their 
rhetoric, gradually accepting the validity of community norms and beginning 
to engage in an argumentative process with their opponents, at home and 
abroad. While adaptation refers to an instrumental adjustment to internatio-
nal norms irrespective of discursive practices, socialisation through dis-
course emphasises processes of communication, argumentation, and persu-
asion. There are few signs that Norwegian policymakers have reached such a 
stage in the socialisation process, but we can sense an increased understand-
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ing of the EU. Until 2000, Norwegian relations with the EU were handled 
under the Division for Trade in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whereas 
NATO matters and relations with the USA or the former Soviet Union were 
dealt with in its Division for Security Policy. Then., with the new Labour 
government in 2000, a Department for Political cooperation with the EU was 
established This indicates that the importance of the EU as a political actor 
(and not only an economic power) had been recognised in Norwegian for-
eign policy. The recent White Book on Norway’s relations with Europe/EU 
also marks a shift in this direction, by mentioning to the latest developments 
in the integration process and emphasising the need for renewed debate on 
Norway’s relations to the EU (Utenriksdepartementet 2000). According to 
the government, recent developments within the EU) make the existing 
cooperation agreements insufficient for Norway. Although these ministerial 
changes indicate increased recognition of the EU as a political actor, they 
have its limitations, since the military dimension of the EU – the ESDP – is 
the purview of the Division for Security Policy, where NATO still is seen as 
the dominant actor. This continued emphasis on the trans-Atlantic link can 
be explained by Norway’s reluctance to accept that the EU is developing 
towards an important independent actor also in military terms.  
While we can recognise the first three or four phases in the development 
of Norwegian security thinking, there are no signs of it moving further. 
According to Risse and Sikkink, the fifth and final phase of the socialisation 
process comes when the international norms become institutionalised in the 
domestic discourse This phase is characterised by learning and not only 
adaptation to external changes. The more the political elites accept the valid-
ity of norms and the more they engage in a dialogue about norm implemen-
tation, the more likely are they to institutionalise these norms in domestic 
practices. There is nothing to indicate that the Norwegian security discourse 
has reached this stage yet. This will probably not happen until Norway is a 
full paricipant in the structures of the European Union.  
This analysis has shown that it is feasible to speak of the Europeanisation 
of Norwegian security thinking. As yet, however, this Europeanisation has 
stayed on the instrumental level – Norway has not arrived at the stage in the 
socialisation process where its national security identity is truly challenged. 
Profound changes require a certain level of participation, but Norway’s parti-
cipation in EU institutions is limited, and there is little room for discussions 
and debate. The various agreements that Norway has reached with the EU 
imply a certain level of participation, but this does not mean that Norwegian 
officials and policymakers are participating directly in the discussions/de-
bates through which EU’s security policy is defined. On the other hand, the 
increased recognition of the EU as a political actor might be a result of the 
many informal and bilateral contacts that Norway has managed to establish 
during the past decade.  
In summary, we can illustrate the development of Norway’s security 
identity by distinguishing between two dimensions of security and three pha-
ses, as shown in the chart below. 
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We must conclude that the EU influences the national security identity but 
that it is limited in the case of Norway due to the level and the character of 
Norwegian participation. Norway has developed close relations with the EU 
in many areas, but the importance of this participation must not be exagge-
rated. Norway’s security identity is indeed influenced – but less through 
argumentation and persuasion than by instrumental adaptation. This adapta-
tion is felt necessary especially in relation to the ESDP process, where 
Norway as a non-member is forced to adapt in order to avoid becoming 
marginalised. Although adaptation is dominant, we may identify some 
aspects of identity change, especially concerning to the increased recognition 
of the EU as an important political actor and the beginning of a broader 
understanding of security. This indicates a slight change in identity: from 
emphasising Atlanticism and territorial defence, Norway now tends towards 
greater Europeanism and comprehensive security approach. 
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